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RETHINKING THE LEGALITY OF
COLOMBIA’S ATTACK ON THE FARC IN
ECUADOR:  A NEW PARADIGM FOR
BALANCING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY,
SELF-DEFENSE AND THE DUTIES
OF SOVEREIGNTY
Frank M. Walsh*
INTRODUCTION
On March 1, 2008, the Amazon jungle’s predawn quiet was
shattered as the Colombian military executed Operation Phoe-
nix, a combined arms attack on a Fuerzas Armadas Revolucion-
arias de Colombia (“FARC”) terrorist1 base located in
Ecuadorian territory.2  Colombian Super Tucano aircraft
targeted the FARC base from a distance and fired upon the
camp while remaining in Colombian air space.3  Following the
air strike, Colombian troops crossed the border and entered the
FARC base to verify that the targets had been eliminated.  Op-
eration Phoenix accomplished its goals: the Colombian Air
* Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 2007; Yale University, B.A. 2004.
This article is dedicated to Katia M. Walsh for her strength and support.
1 The FARC, a narcoterrorist organization with over 6,000 members, is listed
on the Department of State’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. See U.S.
State Department, Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Apr. 30, 2001),
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).  Designation
as a FTO triggers a number of sanctions, including visa restrictions and the freez-
ing of funds of these groups in American financial institutions.  Additionally, the
designation is intended to raise public awareness of the concerns that the United
States has about the FTO’s. See MARK P. SULLIVAN, LATIN AMERICA: TERRORISM
ISSUES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2005), at CRS –
4, http://www.fas. org/irp/crs/RS21049.pdf.
2 See Joshua Goodman, Colombian Rebel Leader Raul Reyes Killed by Army,
Minister Says, BLOOMBERG ONLINE, Mar. 1, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5HnABwKGrZc [hereinafter Goodman]; Simon Ro-
mero, Colombian Forces Kill Senior Guerilla Commander, Official Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at 18.
3 See On the Warpath, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2008, at 43; Goodman, supra
note 2.
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Force killed Raul Reyes, the FARC’s second-highest ranking
leader, and 20 other members of the FARC.4  The strike also
yielded voluminous electronic documents from Reyes’ personal
computer and electronic media storage.5
Operation Phoenix immediately drew criticism from the in-
ternational community, with detractors condemning Colombia’s
military strike as an illegal violation of Ecuador’s territorial
sovereignty, suggesting that Colombia should have consulted
with Ecuador before launching an attack to avoid encroaching
upon Ecuador’s sovereignty.6  Venezuelan President Hugo Cha-
vez, widely viewed as sympathetic to the FARC cause,7 con-
demned the attack, broke off diplomatic relations with
Colombia, and ordered Venezuelan troops to the Colombian bor-
der.  Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa followed suit, break-
ing off relations and ordering troops to the border.8  Within a
week, a majority of the member states of the Organization of
American States (“OAS”) had denounced the action.9
Despite the international condemnation, however, the issue
of whether Operation Phoenix actually violated international
law is not as clear-cut as some critics would believe.  Rather,
Operation Phoenix’s widespread condemnation is the result of
an oversimplified and incomplete understanding of the north-
ern Andean reality.  The condemnation was incomplete because
it failed to account for newly publicized connections between Ec-
uador and the FARC.  The condemnation was oversimplified be-
cause critics failed to account for several principles of
international law, including the right to self-defense and a
4 See The War Behind the Insults, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2008, at 12, avail-
able at http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10808543
[hereinafter The War Behind the Insults].
5 Patricia Markey, Colombia Says FARC Documents Show Correa Ties,
REUTERS, Mar. 3, 2003, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSN0229738
220080303 [hereinafter Markey].
6 See The War Behind the Insults, supra note 4, at 12.
7 See generally Chavez: Take FARC Off Terror List, CNN ONLINE, Jan. 11,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/01/11/chavez.farc/index.html.
8 Stephan Kuffner & Puerto Nuevo, South America’s Most Troubled Border,
TIME ONLINE, Apr. 18, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,1732271,00.html.
9 Chris Kraul, Neighbors take aim at Colombia over incursion, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2008, at A-3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/05/world/fg-
oas5.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/4
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state’s duty to prevent its territory from being used for terrorist
activity.
The fundamental problem with this area of international
law is that jurists fail to accord several principles that are in
tension.  Some parties argue for territorial integrity, others ar-
gue self-defense, and still others argue that all states of the
world have fundamental responsibilities to the world order.  In-
stead of dealing with how these principles interact, jurists have
often argued their points in isolation.  This article rejects the
status quo and synthesizes existing international law into a
new paradigm for the use of force against terrorists in a third
party state.  In this new paradigm, described infra, the theories
of territorial integrity, self-defense, and the responsibilities of
sovereignty are all integrated into a single algorithm.  The al-
gorithm works by mapping out the potential policy space onto a
two-dimensional model with the axes defined by international
law.
This article analyzes Operation Phoenix’s legality in three
parts.  First, the article discusses the historical background to
the Colombian civil war, the aftermath of Operation Phoenix,
and newly publicized information suggesting a relationship be-
tween the FARC and the Ecuadorian government.  Second, the
article describes several fundamental principles of interna-
tional law that the critics of Operation Phoenix overlooked.  Fi-
nally, the article sets forth a new paradigm for analyzing the
use of force against terrorists in third party states and applies
that paradigm to Operation Phoenix.
I. OPERATION PHOENIX AND ITS AFTERMATH
a. The FARC’s Journey from Colombia to Ecuador
The story of the FARC’s involvement in Ecuador begins de-
cades earlier in Colombia.10  The Colombian government has
been battling the FARC for over fifty years.11  The conflict has
10 See Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help? An Analysis of the Co-
lombian Peace Process, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 23, 26-29 (2000) [hereinafter Esquirol].
11 Luz E. Nagle, Colombian Asylum Seekers: What Practitioners Should Know
About the Colombian Crisis, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 441, 454  (2004) [hereinafter
Colombian Asylum Seekers].
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left as much as 40% of the country12 under the de facto control
of major narcoterrorist groups.13  Only in the past six years has
Colombia, under the leadership of President Alvaro Uribe and
with the assistance of American military aid, been able to turn
the tide in the war on the FARC.  As the Colombian military
increased the territory under its control, the FARC was pushed
farther and farther into Colombia’s southwestern jungles.  Over
time, the FARC began crossing the border with Ecuador and
began using the area for supplies and recuperation.14
The FARC began as a Marxist revolutionary group in the
1950’s but has since lost its ideological support15 and has since
become a simple violent criminal organization.16 For a large
portion of Colombia’s history, the FARC was able to operate
with near impunity in the country’s southern jungles.  The war
with the FARC has claimed the lives of more than 250,000
Colombians and has forcibly displaced more than 1,350,000.17
The low point in the war came in 1998 when Colombian Presi-
dent Andre´s Pastrana ceded land equivalent to the size of Swit-
12 See id. (noting that a proposal was submitted by President Pastrana, which
would have awarded autonomy to an area comprising approximately 40% of Co-
lombian territory).
13 Jeremy McDermott, FARC: Rebels Without a Cause?, BBC ONLINE, May 21,
2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1998304.stm.
14 Arie Farnam, Colombia’s Civil War Drifts into Ecuador, THE CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR, July 11, 2002, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0711/
p07s01-woam.html.
15 See Luz E. Nagle, Placing Blame Where Blame is Due: The Culpability of
Illegal Armed Groups and Narcotraffickers in Colombia’s Environmental and
Human Rights Catastrophes, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 22-23
(2004) [hereinafter Placing Blame Where Blame is Due]. The Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionaria de Colombia-Ejercito del Pueblo (“FARC”) began in 1947, when the
central committee of the Colombian Communist party fortified the central cordil-
lera in the Andes to fight against the conservative regime of Ospina Perez.  In
1964, FARC dissidents created the Ejercito de Libernacion Nacional (“ELN”) as
what one commentator called the “result of the combination of a Marxist ideology
and the fanatic and messianic elements of religious origin.” Id.
16 See ANDREW FEICKERT, U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERRORISM: AFGHANISTAN, AFRICA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND COLUMBIA, CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2005), http://www.ndu.edu/li-
brary/docs/crs/crs_rl32758_04feb05.pdf.
17 See Placing Blame Where Blame is Due, supra note 15, at 12; see also NOR-
WEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN 2004 11 (2004),  http://www.internal-displacement.
org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/5136B3B276CF8B9580257090004E66A8/
$file/Global_overview_2004_final_low.pdf (explaining that Colombia has the
world’s second largest internally displaced person population).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/4
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zerland to the FARC rebels.18  The FARC then proceeded to use
the territory as a safe haven to train insurgents and even began
producing fraudulent documents for European and Middle
Eastern terrorist groups.19
Since 2002, Colombia has been able to turn the tide against
the FARC for two primary reasons: increased American aid and
the determined leadership of President Alvaro Uribe.  First,
American aid has become more robust.  American efforts to deal
with Colombian narcoterrorism had traditionally focused al-
most exclusively on the drug interdiction/eradication effort.20
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative, commonly called Plan Co-
lombia, limited American Coercive action to counternarcotics
operations.21  After September 11, 2001, however, Congress ex-
panded Plan Colombia to include other countries in the Andean
region.22  With the amendments, the United States began to
equip Colombia with the tools it would need to beat an en-
trenched militarized enemy.
The second factor in Colombia’s recent successes has been
the determined leadership of President Uribe.23  Winning a
landslide victory in 2002, this Oxford and Harvard educated
conservative reinvigorated the Plan Colombia, specifically by
18 Christopher Marquis, Colombian Deal with Rebels is Vexing U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2001, at 1.
19 See Brian Lavery, World Briefing Europe: 3 Sought In COLOMBIA Return To
Ireland, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at A6 (describing how three Irish Republican
Army suspects fled COLOMBIA last year after they were sentenced to 17-year prison
sentences for teaching Marxist rebels how to make bombs secretly); see also Nagle,
Colombian Asylum Seekers, supra note 11, at 454 (discussing how the Hizbollah
operatives suspiciously opened a meat packing plant in an area not known for its
cattle ranching).
20 See Esquirol, supra note 10, at 85-86.
21 See generally President George W. Bush, Supporting Democracy in Colom-
bia, NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 18, Nov. 2002 (recognizing the
link between narcotraffickers and terrorists).
22 See Hale Sheppard, The Andean Trade Preference Act: Past Accomplish-
ments and Present Circumstances Warrants its Immediate Renewal and Expan-
sion, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 743, 767-78 (2003).
23 The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan Colombia Suc-
cesses and Remaining Challenges Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform,
108th Cong., 81-91 (2004) (statement of Luis Alberto Moreno, Colombian ambassa-
dor to the United States), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/get
doc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:96408.pdf. (“The United States has
provided more than $3.2 billion in assistance to date, while Colombian resources
have totaled $6 billion.”). Id. at 81.
5
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reducing violence.24  The American in charge of Southern Com-
mand, General James T. Hill, said, “Uribe is a unique leader
who has galvanized the will of the people and motivated his
armed forces.  He has personally demonstrated that one indi-
vidual can change the course of events.”25  Uribe’s early suc-
cesses have been comprehensive:
In the three years since his election, Uribe’s incarnation of Plan
Colombia has lowered homicides and “acts of terrorism” more
than 40%, lowered coca and heroin poppy cultivation by more
than 30%, increased the number of “alternative” or legal crops
from 1,500 hectares to 43,951 hectares, and helped more than 2.3
million have gain access to public health care. Uribe’s successes
against drug trafficking have been matched by some successes
against the insurgency: during Uribe’s term of office the number
of active narcoterrorists has fallen from 35,000 to 12,000.26
More recent reports state that the FARC’s numbers have fallen
even lower.27
But Colombia’s successes have led to new problems:
namely, an exodus of the FARC into neighboring Ecuador.  Ec-
uador shares its 400-mile northeastern border with Colombia.
The region along the border is not as developed as the rest of
the country; consequently, the majority of people living near the
Ecuadorian-Colombian border live in small villages and towns.
The dense jungle and the lack of development make the area
difficult, if not impossible, to control and at least one foreign
security official claimed that the Ecuadorian military rarely
comes within twenty miles of the border.28  While the Ecuado-
24 Jeremy McDermott, Profile: Alvaro Uribe, BBC ONLINE, Aug. 7, 2002, http:/
/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1996976.stm.
25 Defense Department Counternarcotic Efforts: Hearing before the House
Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong. (Mar. 24, 2004) (statement by General
James T. Hill, Commander United States Southern Command).
26 See Frank Walsh, Synchronizing Colombian Narcoterrorism Policy with the
War on Terror: The Legality of Military Deployment by the United States and the
Organization of American States, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 453, 462 (2006).
27 Jeremy McDermott, Colombia’s Rebels: A Fading Force? BBC ONLINE, Feb.
1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7217817.stm (noting that government
figures place the current number of rebel fighters from 6,000 – 8,000, down from
16,000 in 2001).
28 See Robert Taylor, Caught in the Crossfire, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Vol. 49
(Sept. 2002), available at http://worldpress.org/Americas/670.cfm#down (stating
“The concern over the increasing FARC presence in Ecuador resulted in numerous
opinion pieces in the Ecuadorian media.”). Id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/4
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rian military has made efforts to stop the FARC, claiming to
have destroyed 47 FARC camps in 2007, Colombian officials re-
mained unimpressed with Ecuadorian action.29
Thus, in late February 2008, the FARC was firmly estab-
lished in Ecuador as Colombian forces pursued the narcoter-
rorists on Colombian soil.  When Colombian authorities
received actionable intelligence that Raul Reyes was at a FARC
camp less than two miles into Ecuadorian territory, Colombian
officials decided to act and neutralize one of the narcoterrorist
organization’s top leaders.
b. The International Community Condemns Colombia
The international response to Colombia’s attack was quick
and negative.  The Organization of American States (“OAS”),
under Secretary General Jose´ Miguel Insulza, convened its per-
manent council on March 4th.30  Ecuador’s Foreign Minister ar-
gued her nation’s case, based largely on Article 21 of the
Organization of American States’ Charter:
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even
temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force
taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds
whatsoever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages ob-
tained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be
recognized.31
Secretary General Insulza expounded on the importance of ter-
ritorial integrity:
[t]his principle is one of the cornerstones of the international legal
order and, in particular, the inter-American legal system, and a
principle that has always been indisputably linked to the princi-
29 Sibylla Brodzinsky, On Ecuador’s Border, FARC Rebels Visit Often, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 10, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.csmoni-
tor.com/2008/0310/p07s02-wogn.html.
30 Ray Walser, The Crisis in the Andes: Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION ONLINE, May 2, 2008, available at http://www.heritage.org/
research/LatinAmerica/hl1080.cfm (originally delivered before the House Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Apr. 10, 2008)
[hereinafter Walser].
31 Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 21, Apr. 30, 1948, 2
U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
7
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ple of peaceful settlement of controversies between States and co-
operation to safeguard peace, security, and development.32
After heated debate, the OAS issued a resolution on March 5th
reaffirming “the principle that the territory of a state is inviola-
ble and may not be the object, even temporarily of military occu-
pation or other measures of force taken by another State,
directly or indirectly, on any ground whatsoever.”  On March
17th, the OAS ministers reconvened and issued another resolu-
tion condemning Colombian action but reemphasizing a na-
tion’s responsibility to control terrorist activity on its own soil:
[The Parties Agree] to reject the incursion by Colombian military
forces and police personnel into the territory of Ecuador, in the
Province of Sucumbı´os, on March 1, 2008, carried out without the
knowledge or prior consent of the Government of Ecuador, since it
was a clear violation of Articles 19 and 21 of the OAS Charter.
[. . .]
To reiterate the firm commitment of all member states to combat
threats to security caused by the actions of irregular groups or
criminal organizations, especially those associated with drug
trafficking.33
At the end of the day, Colombia was left with mixed results.  It
had killed an internationally known narcoterrorist leader and
dealt the FARC a devastating blow.  On the other hand, Colom-
bia was condemned for its actions and lost immeasurable inter-
national political capital.  It is doubtful whether Bogota would
be able to conduct a similar raid if it received similar intelli-
gence in the future.
c. New Evidence of Clandestine Connections: Ecuador’s
Contact with the FARC’s Operations Against Colombia
The OAS’s condemnation of Colombia, however, was pre-
mature and new information made public after Operation Phoe-
nix substantially altered any analysis of the Operation’s
legality.  During the Operation, Colombian soldiers salvaged
three laptop computers, two external hard drives, and three
USB memory sticks from the FARC camp.  The laptops and me-
dia storage devices contained startling information: according
32 Walser, supra note 30.
33 See id.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/4
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 79 Side A      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 79 Side A      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR104.txt unknown Seq: 9 25-MAR-09 7:33
2009] COLOMBIA’S ATTACK ON THE FARC IN ECUADOR 145
to the confiscated files, the Ecuadorian government and Raul
Reyes had been in contact discussing political proposals and
projects on the frontier.34  The files explained that Gustavo Lar-
rea, an Ecuadorian defense minister close to President Rafael
Correa, had repeatedly communicated with FARC com-
manders.35  “One document revealed an offer by the Ecuadorian
government to transfer police and army commanders in the
area who proved hostile to the FARC.”36  Another document
stated that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a personal
friend of Correa’s, funneled at least $300 million to the FARC.37
President Correa immediately denied the allegation as
“completely false” and the work of “an extremely cynical [Co-
lombian] government.”38  President Chavez followed suit, call-
ing the allegation “ridiculous.”39  Ecuadorian Interior Minister
Fernando Bustamante attacked the authenticity of the docu-
ments, saying that “it is very easy to say something based on
evidence that has not been scrutinized publicly or internation-
ally.”40  Colombia responded to the denials by submitting the
laptops and media storage devices to the International Criminal
Police Organization, commonly known as “Interpol,” for its
verification.
At Interpol, 64 different agents spent over 4,000 hours ana-
lyzing the computers.41  In total, Interpol reviewed “over 600
gigabytes of data including: 37,872 written documents, 452
spreadsheets, 210,888 images, 22,481 web pages, 7,989 email
addresses, 10,537 multimedia files (sound and video), and 983
34 Markey, supra note 5.
35 See id.
36 Id.
37 Helen Murphy and Joshua Goodman, Uribe Seeks Trial for Chavez in Inter-
national Court, BLOOMBERG ONLINE, Mar. 4, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=av8Hk0ffaBAE.
38 Jose Llangari, Ecuador’s Correa Denies Ties with Colombian Rebels,
REUTERS, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN03354
607.
39 Chavez Denies Charges of Ties to Colombia Rebels, REUTERS, May 11, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSN11559327._CH_.2400.
40 Markey, supra note 5.
41 Ronald K. Noble, Press Statement, The International Criminal Police Or-
ganization [INTERPOL], Forensic Report on FARC Computers and Hardware
Seized by Colombia (May 15, 2008), available at http://www.interpol.int/public/
icpo/speeches/2008/sgbogota20080516.asp# [hereinafter Noble].
9
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encrypted files.”42  Interpol’s findings were as conclusive as its
investigation was extensive: Interpol found that “no user files
have been created, modified or deleted on any of the eight FARC
computer exhibits following their seizure on 1 March 2008.”43
In its final forensic report, Interpol also explained that Colom-
bia’s specialized Grupo Investgativo de Delitos Informaticos had
“followed internationally recognized principles in the handling
of electronic evidence.”44
Interpol’s response was even stronger after Ecuador contin-
ued to question the files’ authenticity despite Interpol’s report.
In a media release published after Ecuador publicly questioned
whether Interpol’s report was conclusive in establishing a con-
nection between Ecuador and the FARC, Interpol was unapo-
logetic in its adamant reaffirmation that the documents
reflected such a connection:
If Ecuador has objections with the content of the user files, then
Ecuador should criticize the FARC because the seized computers
belonged to the FARC. Yet, to date, INTERPOL has not read any
account of Ecuador denouncing or criticizing the FARC in relation
to any user files content in the seized computer exhibits allegedly
implicating Ecuador or any of its government officials.
[. . .]
In the interests of international police co-operation, INTERPOL
hopes that Ecuador will control its repeated tendency to attack
INTERPOL for simply having reported the truth in an impartial
manner. If there is indeed content in the seized FARC computer
user files with which Ecuador disagrees, then it should complain
to and criticize the FARC, not INTERPOL.45
Despite the picture it attempted to paint as a helpless victim,
Ecuador’s political elite had been cultivating a relationship with
the FARC.
42 Id.
43 Media Release, INTERPOL, INTERPOL Reaffirms Key Findings of its Ex-
amination of Seized FARC Computers in Response to Efforts to Distort Conclu-
sions, (June 13, 2008), available at http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/Press
Releases/PR2008/PR200826.asp.
44 INTERPOL, Forensics Report on FARC Computers and Hardware Seized
by Colombia, (May 15, 2008), available at, http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/
speeches/2008/sgbogota20080516.asp#.
45 Media Release, INTERPOL, supra note 43.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/4
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The fundamental problem with Operation Phoenix’s inter-
national critics, in early March 2008, was that their opinion was
based on imperfect information.  If one were to assume that Co-
lombia decided to suddenly launch a strike into the territory of
its innocent neighbor, then the Operation’s illegality would un-
derstandably be clear.  But that was not the reality in March
2008.  Rather, Colombia was the victim of systematic attacks
from a narcoterrorist enemy intent on the collapse of the gov-
ernment in Bogota.46  Not only had Ecuador sat by as the FARC
used its territory to launch attacks on Colombia, but at least
some Ecuadorian authorities had begun to actively communi-
cate with FARC officials.  Colombia’s attack was not unpro-
voked, Ecuador was not innocent, and Operation Phoenix was
not a black and white situation.
II. FORGOTTEN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELF DEFENSE AND THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF SOVEREIGNTY
The new information about Ecuador’s involvement with the
FARC precipitates a renewed analysis of the applicable princi-
ples of international law.  While the international response to
Operation Phoenix was almost universal in its rejection of the
use of force to attack a terrorist threat on foreign soil, this con-
demnation was not a foregone conclusion from a legal perspec-
tive.  The issue of attacking a terrorist enemy on foreign soil is a
much more complex issue than many of Operation Phoenix’s
critics acknowledged.
Notably, the international community undervalued two
principles of international law: the right of self-defense and the
duties of sovereignty.  First, each nation has the right to defend
itself.  To borrow from a phrase used in American constitutional
jurisprudence, international law is not a suicide pact.47  Inter-
national law has long recognized the right to use force to repel
aggressive attacks.  Second, critics of Operation Phoenix also
failed to consider Ecuador’s culpability.  If Ecuador had pre-
46 See Sibylla Brodzinsky, Interpol: Colombia Did Not Doctor FARC Files, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 16, 2008, available at http://www.csmonitor.
com/2008/0516/p25s06-woam.html (describing how the FARC was planning on
taking loans that would be repaid when they “take power”).
47 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 36 (1949) (“There is danger that,
if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”). Id.
11
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vented the FARC from operating in Ecuadorian territory, then
Colombia would have had no need to cross the border.  Thus, it
was Ecuador’s failure to exercise sovereignty over its territory
that was a predicate to the FARC’s attacks on Colombia.  From
this perspective, Ecuador at least shares the fault for the viola-
tion of territorial limits because it was Ecuador’s failure to exer-
cise sovereignty that lay at the root of Colombia’s decision to
launch Operation Phoenix.
In sum, Colombia has a bona fide argument that its actions
were completely legal under international law.  This article will
examine this argument by (1) reviewing the absolute right of
self-defense and (2) showing how the right to territorial integ-
rity is not an absolute right but rather is coupled with the duty
of properly safeguarding that territory.
a. Self-Defense Under International Law
The international community has ignored, or at best under-
valued, the principle of self-defense in its treatment of Opera-
tion Phoenix.  Established international law has historically
emphasized the importance of a nation’s right to defend itself
against attacks.  The right of self-defense is a jus cogens48 prin-
ciple of customary international law.49  Even the Kellogg-Bri-
and Pact, the controversial accord commonly known as the
Treaty for the Renunciation of War, acknowledged the impor-
tance of the right of armed self-defense.50  Indeed, international
48 DIMITRIOS DELIBASIS, THE RIGHT TO NATIONAL SELF-DEFENCE IN INFORMA-
TION WARFARE OPERATIONS 127 (2007) (Jus cogens is an international term of art
meaning an international principle so established that the principle cannot be ad-
justed by treaty).
49 See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 236
(1961) (arguing that notions of self defense has roots grounded in national sover-
eignty principles); see also Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, Re-
port of the International Law Commission Covering its First Session, U.N. GAOR,
4th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/925 (Apr. 12-Jun. 9, 1949) (stating that
“[e]very State has the right of individual or collective self-defense against an
armed attack”). Id.
50 See Quincy Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 AM. J. INT’L L. 39,
42-43 (1933).  Correspondence exchanged between the delegates made it clear self-
defense was still allowed even in a world order where aggressive war was out-
lawed. Id. The French delegate said the treaty “would not deprive the signatories
of the right of legitimate defense,” the British delegate said that “the right of self-
defense was inalienable,” and the American delegate maintained that “[t[here is
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/4
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law would be a futile effort if it worked as a suicide pact that
forced states to stand idly by while its citizens were attacked.
Protecting legitimate self-defense stems from the central as-
sumption of the entire Westphalian state system: nations have
the right to protect their own interests and citizens.51
The United Nations Charter (“UN Charter”) is often cited
as the paradigmatic example of international law’s ban on war-
fare.  Article 2(4) imposes a general ban on the use of force:
[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Purposes of the United Nations.52
However, this general prohibition is subject to an exception in
Article 51 designed to safeguard the right to self-defense:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.53
Thus, a state has the power to defend itself until such time as
the Security Council takes the necessary steps to neutralize the
threat.
Additionally, the framers of the Charter intended Article 51
to have a wide standard when it came to classifying threats to
peace.54  This construction is apparent when comparing the En-
glish text to the equally official French text of the Charter; the
French version uses the term “aggression” instead of “armed at-
tack” in Article 51, suggesting the legitimacy of armed self-de-
nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty to restrict or impair in any
way the right of self-defense.” Id.
51 See Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Use of Conventional International
Law in Combating Terrorism: A Maginot Line for Modern Civilization Employing
the Principles of Anticipatory Self-Defense & Preemption, 55 A.F.L. REV. 87, 106
(2004) [hereinafter Kastenberg].
52 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
53 Id. at art. 51.
54 See id. art. 2, para. 4; see also Christopher C. Joyner & Michael A. Gri-
maldi, The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contem-
porary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 621, 652 (1985) [hereinafter Joyner &
Grimaldi].
13
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fense against even non-military coercive actions.55  The
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) recognized this wide stan-
dard of “aggression” in Nicaragua v. United States.56  In that
case, the ICJ acknowledged that “armed bands, groups, irregu-
lars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to . . . an actual
armed attack conducted by regular forces” constitute
aggression.57
Thus, for situations like Operation Phoenix, two conflicting
principles of international law are in tension: the right to terri-
torial integrity and the right to self-defense.  The international
community focused on the former, the Colombian government
argued the latter.  Blanket rules are not appropriate for solving
situations like this.  Instead, each situation should be analyzed
on a case-by-case basis to determine where on the spectrum be-
tween territorial integrity and self-defense a situation exists.
Just because the FARC’s actions could trigger self-defense,
however, does not ipso facto give Colombia the right to conduct
operations on Ecuadorian soil.  Borders, and the importance of
the nation-state in the Westphalian system, preclude victims of
terrorism from completely ignoring national borders in the hunt
for terrorists.  Since the earliest articulations of self-defense in
the 17th century, international jurists have recognized that the
right to self-defense must be limited so as not to allow any coun-
try to conduct any operation in the guise of protecting against a
phantom future menace.58  Instead, the difficult task is deciding
when a nation who is the victim of an armed attack under Arti-
55 See John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future
of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 83 (1986). But see Joyner & Grimaldi, supra
note 54, at 652. See generally Jonathan A. Bush, “The Supreme . . . Crime” and its
Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 2324 (2004) (presenting a detailed history of what constitutes “aggression”
and the various international standards regarding aggressive war).
56 Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 215
(June 27, 1986) [hereinafter Nicar. v. U.S.].
57 Id. at 103.
58 See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, Book II, Chapter
I (Kessinger Publishing, 2004) (1625) [hereinafter GROTIUS]; EMMERICH DE VAT-
TELL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, Book II, Chapter
IV (1758), available at, http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/vattel/vatt-204.htm [here-
inafter De Vattell].
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/4
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cle 51 can violate a host nation’s borders to neutralize the
threat.  This task is discussed in Section III.
b. A Nation’s Right to Territorial Integrity is Coupled with
the Right to Prevent Aggressors From Operating on that
Nation’s Territory
The critics of Operation Phoenix also undervalued the fact
that territorial sovereignty comes with responsibility.  Critics
centered their arguments on Ecuador’s absolute right over its
territory, but this traditional Westphalian ideal has been lim-
ited in modern times.  The traditional Westphalian state sys-
tem was predicated on the idea that each state could operate its
territory in any way it wanted; sovereignty was absolute.  How-
ever, the 20th century has seen this absolute right qualified in a
myriad of ways.59  A nation can no longer violate fundamental
humanitarian law,60 commit war crimes,61 commit crimes
against humanity,62 or conduct genocide63 on its own territory.
59 See Bruce Broomhall, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Pros-
pects: Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for
Crimes Under International Law, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 399, 400 (2001).
60 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
61 See Beverly Izes, Drawing Lines in the Sand: When State-Sanctioned Ab-
ductions of War Criminals Should be Permitted, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1,
18 (1997) (the option is to “[e]xtradite or prosecute.”  “[N]o state should offer a safe
haven to individuals who are accused of serious crimes under international law”).
62  Gwynne Skinner, Nuremburg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg Trials’
Influence on Human Rights Litigation in the U.S. Courts Under the Alien Torts
Statute,  71 ALB. L. REV. 321, 327-28 (2008).  Skinner describes the growing inter-
national consensus that crimes against humanity are the concern of all nations:
Prior to the Nuremberg trials, there existed no specific legal precedent for
subjecting offenses such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, such
as genocide, to the principle of universal  jurisdiction. Because of Nurem-
berg, the idea that there is universal jurisdiction over those who commit
such offenses gained legitimacy. In addition, in the aftermath of World
War II, members of the United Nations recognized that offenses such as
crimes against humanity and genocide were the concern of all States, and
that each State’s domestic institutions, such as courts, should be responsi-
ble for remedying these wrongs.
Id.
63 See Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility
and National Reconciliation: The UN Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 AM. J.
INT’L L. 952, 954-55 (2001) (describing how a state cannot grant immunity to per-
petrators of genocide); see also Prosecutor v. Niyonteze, Tribunal militaire de divi-
sion 2, Lausanne, Apr. 30, 1999 (a Swiss military court agreed it possessed
15
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Similarly, the international community has chipped away at a
state’s right to foster international terrorism on its own soil.
Thus, territorial integrity has been coupled with the duty to
prevent terrorists from operating within one’s territory.  Almost
without exception, declarations that a state’s territory is invio-
late are coupled with qualifications that the state must deny
safe harbor to terrorists and aggressive irregular forces.64  The
traditional articulation of this duty was included in both the
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations65 and the Decla-
ration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and
Sovereignty66: “no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance,
incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities di-
rected towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another
State, or interfere in another State.”67  The inclusion of provi-
sions like the one quoted immediately supra illustrates the
types of responsibilities with respect to combating terrorism
that come with territorial sovereignty.
Some international jurists have gone so far as to say that
tolerating terrorist organizations could constitute an act of ag-
gression sufficient to allow the target of the terrorist attacks to
attack the host nation itself.68  Justice Jackson, Chief Counsel
jurisdiction over a Rwandan mayor accused of war crimes originating in the
Rwanda genocide).
64 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), paras. 33-34, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.
No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV)]; G.A.
Res. 2131(XX), para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter G.A.
Res. 2131 (XX)].
65 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 64, para. 56.
66 G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), supra note 64, para. 2.
67 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 64; G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), supra note 64.
68 See, e.g., Yehuda Z. Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double
Standard: A Reploy to Professor Richard A. Falk, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 80 (1970)
[hereinafter Yehuda].  Justice Jackson built upon earlier legal instruments that
had suggested tolerating terrorist activity constituted aggression.  For example,
the 1933 “Act Related to the Definition of the Aggressor,” adopted by the Commit-
tee on Security Questions of the General Commission of the League of Nations
Disarmament Conference, defined aggression as including “support to armed
bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or
refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take in its own terri-
tory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance and
protection.” Id.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/4
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for the United States at the Nuremberg tribunal, argued in his
opening statement that aggression included the:
provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of an-
other State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the in-
vaded State, to take in its own territory, all the measures in its
power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.69
In 1954, the United Nations International Law Commission
prepared a Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Secur-
ity of Mankind and categorized the toleration of terrorist activi-
ties as an international crime:
The following acts are offences against the peace and security of
mankind:
[t]he organization, or the encouragement of the organization, by
the authorities of a State, of armed bands within its territory or
any other territory for incursions into the territory of another
State, or toleration of the organization of such bands in its own
territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed bands of its
territory as a base of operations or as a point of departure for
incursions into the territory of another State, as well as direct
participation in or support of such incursions.70
In sum, there is a myriad of international sources supporting
the idea that states should not and cannot harbor terrorists
within their border.  Failing to take action against terrorists is
at best a failure in a state’s sovereign duties and at worst an act
of aggression.  As the Security Council succinctly stated in its
resolution condemning Libya for fostering terrorism: “[T]he
suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those
in which States are directly or indirectly involved, is essential
for the maintenance of international peace and security.”71
69 See NOAM CHOMSKY, FAILED STATES 65 (2006) (relying on Justice Jackson’s
definition of aggression); see generally Henry T. King, Jr., Robert Jackson’s Tran-
scendent Influence Over Today’s World, 68 ALB. L. REV. 23 (2004) (describing how
international scholars have echoed Justice Jackson’s articulations of international
law).
70 Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 2(4)
(1954), U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., 504th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 7, UN Doc. 897(IX)
(1954).  In Article 2(6), the Draft Code echoed Justice Jackson’s opening statement:
“[t]he undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of terrorist ac-
tivities in another State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State of organized
activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State.” Id. at art. 2(6).
71 S.C. Res. 748, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (March 31, 1992).
17
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 83 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 83 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR104.txt unknown Seq: 18 25-MAR-09 7:33
154 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:137
III. SYNTHESIZING AN INTERNATIONAL POLICY THAT BALANCES
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF SOVEREIGNTY
The challenge for international jurists and foreign policy
experts alike is deciding how to balance territorial integrity,
self-defense, and the responsibilities of sovereignty that remain
in constant tension.  In the past, the problem has been that in-
ternational jurists have focused on one of these theories and ig-
nored the others.  The theories operated largely in isolation,
with theorists’ arguments passing each other like trains in the
night.  The solution to the status quo is a paradigm that inte-
grates the theories of territorial integrity, self-defense, and the
responsibilities of sovereignty into a single inquiry.
a. The New Paradigm
This article reconciles these three principles by creating a
model that maps out the potential policy space along two axes:
the nature of the terrorist aggression on the x-axis and a host
nation’s culpability on the y-axis.  Figure 1 illustrates the con-
cept, hereinafter referred to as the “New Paradigm.”
Figure 1. A New Paradigm for the Exercise of Self-Defense
The policy space is thus divided into four quadrants: a host
state assisting terrorists engaged in sporadic attacks (Quadrant
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/4
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1), a host state assisting terrorists engaged in ongoing attacks
(Quadrant 2), a host state that has attempted to stop terrorists
engaged in sporadic attacks (Quadrant 3), and a host state that
has attempted to stop terrorists engaged in ongoing attacks
(Quadrant 4).
Deciding where a given scenario lies on this two-dimen-
sional mapping of the potential policy space is a two-step pro-
cess.  First, the more egregious the terrorist threat, the farther
to the right the activity would be plotted.  Second, the more a
host nation assisted the terrorist, the higher the activity would
be plotted.  The two extremes would range from the lower left,
where a benign terrorist threat is being earnestly pursued by
the host country, to the upper right, where a serious terrorist
threat is being assisted by the host country.  A victim nation
threatened by activity in the upper right could lawfully attack
the terrorist threat in the host nation, while a victim nation
threatened by activity in the lower left could not.
This paradigm of thought properly balances territorial in-
tegrity, self-defense, and the responsibilities of sovereignty.  If a
terrorist threat was more egregious or if the host nation was
actively involved in supporting the terrorists, then military op-
erations would be more appropriate.  In short, states that are
victims of terrorist attacks could not attack the terrorists in a
third party host state for activity in Quadrants 1, 3, or 4.  Only
in Quadrant 2, where a terrorist threat presents a grave danger
and a host country is culpable in its behavior, would a victim of
terrorist violence be justified in using force in a host country.
The use of force is not justified for activity in Quadrant 1,
where a host nation is assisting terrorists engaging in sporadic
or isolated attacks, because those kinds of attacks do not rise to
the level sufficient to trigger self-defense.  While there is wide-
spread debate over the issue of what circumstances are suffi-
cient to trigger an exercise of self-defense, there is a general
consensus that an overly expansive view of the doctrine would
destabilize the world order by giving every state a pretext to
engage in aggressive warfare.  Hugo Grotius, in his seminal
work, On the Laws of War and Peace, cautioned against the
overly broad use of self-defense:
The danger, again, must be immediate and imminent in point of
time.  I admit, to be sure, that if the assailant seizes weapons in
19
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such a way that his intent to kill is manifest the crime can be
forestalled; for in morals as in material things a point is not to be
found which does not have certain breadth.  [M]ost wrongs have
their origin in fear, since he who plans to do wrong to another
fears that, if he does not accomplish his purpose, he may himself
suffer harm.72
Emmerich de Vattell echoed this sentiment nearly a century
later, wary of “vague and uncertain suspicions”:
It is safest to prevent the evil when it can be prevented. A nation
has a right to resist an injurious attempt, and to make use of force
and every honorable expedient against whosoever is actually en-
gaged in opposition to her, and even to anticipate his machina-
tions, observing, however, not to attack him upon vague and
uncertain suspicions, lest she should incur the imputation of be-
coming herself an unjust aggressor.73
Put another way, when a particular terrorist activity is minor
in scope, then the right of territorial integrity trumps the right
of self-defense.  The 1837 Caroline Case, the seminal case on
international self-defense, established the standard for lawful
self-defense as a showing of a “necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no moment for deliberation.”74  While
defining the contours of this standard (and analyzing where ex-
actly to place the y-axis in the New Paradigm) is a fact-specific
inquiry that is open to widespread debate, the conceptual point
is clear: minor acts of terrorism cannot serve as grounds for an
exercise of self-defense within a host country’s territory.
The use of force is likewise not warranted in Quadrant 3,
which presents the weakest case for the use of force.  In addi-
tion to the fact that the terrorists attacks in this quadrant are
not grave enough to warrant the violation of international bor-
ders for the same reasons the use of force was not justified
under Quadrant 1, the terrorist activity in Quadrant 3 is also
being actively combated by the host nation.  That is to say, the
host nation is not culpable for the terrorist’s actions.  Thus, the
Article 51 right to self-defense is not triggered and the host
country has not violated its duties as a sovereign nation.
72 GROTIUS, supra note 58, § V(1).
73 DE VATTELL, supra note 58, § 50.
74 See Kastenberg, supra note 51, at 107.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/4
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The use of force is probably not warranted in Quadrant 4,
but this presents the hardest analytical problem in the New
Paradigm.  The Article 51 right of self-defense is triggered in
this scenario, with terrorist engaging in systematic and ongoing
armed attacks on the victim nation.  Thus, as an initial inquiry,
a country would generally be able to take actions in the name of
self-defense against the terrorists.  However, the act of self-de-
fense against the terrorists would violate the territorial sover-
eignty of a host nation who is using “all of its measures” to stop
the terrorists.  Thus, the right of self-defense here directly con-
flicts with the right of territorial integrity.
The “tiebreaker,” for lack of a better term, in this situation
should be the culpability of the host nation.  If a host nation is
earnestly pursuing a campaign against the terrorists, then a
victim nation should not be able to violate the host nation’s ter-
ritorial integrity simply because the victim nation is not satis-
fied with the host’s progress.  Protecting the integrity of a
nation’s borders is critical if the small nations of the world, like
Georgia and or Kuwait, are to survive alongside more powerful
neighbors.  As scholar Robert Kagan writes, “the nation-state
remains as strong as ever, and so, too, the nationalist ambi-
tions, the passions, and the competition among nations that
have shaped history.”75  Thus, even though a victim state might
otherwise be entitled to an exercise of self-defense in other cir-
cumstances, an innocent host nation should be able to rely on
its borders to protect it from the hostile actions of a victim
nation.
One note on scenarios in Quadrant 4: there is a strong case
that a host nation is not using “all of its measures” to combat
the terrorism if the host nation does not request the assistance
of the victim nation to neutralize the terrorists.  Article 52 of
the United Nations Charter codifies the right of collective
defense:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating
to the maintenance of international peace and security as are ap-
propriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or
75 ROBERT KAGAN, THE RETURN OF HISTORY AND THE END OF DREAMS 2 (2008).
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agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations.76
Thus, if a host nation is part of a regional security arrangement
like NATO, then the host nation should rely on such an ar-
rangement to fulfill the host nation’s sovereign responsibility to
eradicate terrorism.
A victim nation should only be entitled to the use of force
for scenarios in Quadrant 2, against a serious terrorist threat in
a host country that is assisting or tolerating the terrorists’ oper-
ations.  Victim nations in this situation have the right to exer-
cise self-defense under Article 51 because the terrorist threat is
sufficiently serious.  Additionally, the fact that the host nation
has “assisted or tolerated”77 the presence of foreign terrorists
undermines the host nation’s claim to territorial integrity.  The
host nation cannot renege on its responsibilities as a sovereign
nation and then rely on its sovereignty as a shield against ac-
tions meant to rectify the host nation’s irresponsible behavior.
To hold otherwise would be to grant terrorists an expansive
loophole in the fabric of international law.
This article has thus far outlined the use of the New Para-
digm for the Exercise of Self-Defense.  The discussion of the
New Paradigm is admittedly broad and theoretical; a detailed
exegesis of the paradigm’s parameters falls outside the scope of
this article.  Rather, this article attempts to set forth a manner
of thinking that reconciles previously disjointed theories of in-
ternational law.  The paradigm’s value is not in establishing
clear distinctions between lawful and unlawful activity, but
rather to present a particular conceptualization of international
law that accords various principles that are often in tension.
The New Paradigm intends to force international jurists to con-
sider all perspectives when deciding whether a situation is law-
76 U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1.
77 See generally Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, supra note 70.  The organization, or the encouragement of the organiza-
tion, by the authorities of a State, of armed bands within its territory or any other
territory for incursions into the territory of another State, or the toleration of the
organization of such bands in its own territory, or the toleration of the use by such
armed bands of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of departure for
incursions into the territory of another State, as well as direct participation in or
support of such incursions. Id. (discussing the lists of offenses against the peace
and security of mankind).
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ful.  Put another way, under the New Paradigm, the trains of
territorial integrity, self-defense, and the responsibilities of sov-
ereignty would no longer be passing in the night.
b. Applying the New Paradigm to Operation Phoenix
As described supra, determining where a particular situa-
tion falls on the New Paradigm is a two-step process.  In the
case of Operation Phoenix, the first step would be to analyze the
severity of the FARC’s attacks on Colombia.  Second, the analy-
sis would center on Ecuador’s culpability in the FARC’s opera-
tions.  These two factors, plotted on the two axes in the New
Paradigm, would then place Operation Phoenix in a quadrant.
The first step of the analysis is straightforward: the FARC
represents a grave threat to the Colombian democracy.  In the
last decade alone, the FARC has committed 16,500 terrorist at-
tacks, murdered 7,500 people, injured another 9,500, and kid-
napped more than 12,000.78  This kind of systematic assault
rises to the level of aggression required to trigger Colombia’s
right to self-defense.79  There can be little question that the
FARC represents a clear and present danger to the continued
existence of the Colombian government.  Therefore, the FARC’s
threat would be placed on the right side of the New Paradigm as
a serious threat sufficient to trigger the right to self-defense.
The second step of the analysis centers on Ecuador’s com-
plicity in the FARC’s operations.  As described supra, states are
forbidden for even tolerating terrorist groups: “no State shall
organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive,
terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent over-
throw of the regime of another State, or interfere in another
State.”80  Ecuador has not only tolerated the FARC’s presence
on Ecuadorian soil, but captured FARC documents indicate that
Ecuador actively assisted the terrorists: Ecuadorian defense
minister Gustavo Larrea, repeatedly communicated with FARC
commanders81 and the Ecuadorian government offered to trans-
fer police and army commanders in the area who proved hostile
78 See Noble, supra note 41.
79 See Nicar. v. U.S, supra note 56.
80 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 64, para. 56; see also G.A. Res. 2131 (XX),
supra note 64, para. 2.
81 See Markey, supra note 5.
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to the FARC.82  Similar to the cases made for host nation culpa-
bility in Lebanon’s support of the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine83 and Cambodia’s tolerance of Vietnamese
irregulars,84 Ecuador’s decision to allow the FARC to operate on
Ecuadorian territory undermined Ecuador’s right to demand
territorial integrity.  Therefore, the FARC’s affirmative steps to
help the FARC place Operation Phoenix in the upper half of the
New Paradigm as an act of self-defense in a host nation that is
complicit in the terrorist activity.
Operation Phoenix is the paradigmatic Quadrant 2 scena-
rio.  Not only is the FARC an established terrorist organization
with a clear power structure but the Colombian authorities
found a proverbial smoking gun implicating Ecuadorian author-
ities.  Interpol objectively analyzed the confiscated media and
verified its authenticity.  Consequently, Colombia is entitled to
exercise its Article 51 right to self-defense in territory controlled
by a government that has seen fit to assist recognized terrorists.
The threat terrorism presents to the rule of law is clear,
and it is incumbent upon the nations of the world to stop terror-
ism when it appears.  At the very least, states must be able to
protect their citizens from ongoing terrorist attacks.  If self-de-
fense is to mean anything, then a country must have the right
to neutralize serious terrorist threats in a host country that is
sympathetic to the terrorists.  Operation Phoenix was the para-
digmatic example of lawful self-defense: the Colombia govern-
ment took action when it became apparent that no one else
would.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the greatest fallacies in international relations
thought is the idea that, if a state does nothing, then nothing
bad will happen to that state.  History has proven that the exact
opposite is the case.  If Colombia had chosen not to launch Op-
eration Phoenix, then Raul Reyes would still be coordinating
FARC terrorist operations and Ecuadorian officials would still
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Yehuda, supra note 68, at 82-84.
84 See, e.g., Captain Timothy Guiden, Defending America’s Cambodian Incur-
sion, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L COMP. L. 215, 231 (1994).
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be collaborating with the FARC.  Colombia, Ecuador, and the
entire Andean ridge would be less safe.
From a purely legal perspective, Operation Phoenix offers
international jurists an opportunity to accord several interna-
tional principles that are often in tension.  The ideas of territo-
rial integrity, self-defense, and the responsibilities of
sovereignty have operated in isolation for far too long.  This ar-
ticle’s New Paradigm integrates these three disparate princi-
ples into a single algorithm that balances the principles in a
way that protects and stabilizes the international world order.
Borders matter, but so does eliminating the threat of terrorism.
Hopefully, history will record that the initial criticism of Opera-
tion Phoenix proved to be an imperfect judgment based on in-
complete facts.  In this way, an air strike deep in the Amazon
might prove to be the catalyst for the recognition of a more
nuanced right of self-defense that equips the nations of the
world with the legal tools need to fight terrorism wherever it
might hide.
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